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FAIRNESS IN AD AUCTIONS THROUGH INVERSE PROPORTIONALITY
SHUCHI CHAWLA1 AND MEENA JAGADEESAN2
We study the tradeoff between social welfare maximization and fairness in the context of ad
auctions. We study an ad auction setting where users arrive one at a time, k advertisers submit
values for each user, and the auction assigns a distribution over ads to each user. Following the
works of Dwork and Ilvento [DI19] and Chawla et al. [CIJ20], our goal is to design a truthful auction
that satisfies “individual fairness” in its outcomes: informally speaking, users that are similar to
each other should obtain similar allocations of ads.
We express the fairness constraint as a kind of stability condition: any two users that are
assigned multiplicatively similar values by all the advertisers must receive additively similar allo-
cations for each advertiser. This value stability constraint is expressed as a function that maps the
multiplicative distance between value vectors to the maximum allowable `∞ distance between the
corresponding allocations. Standard auctions do not satisfy this kind of value stability.
Our main contribution is a new class of allocation algorithms called Inverse Proportional Allo-
cation that achieve value stability with respect to an expressive class of stability conditions. These
allocation algorithms are truthful and prior-free, and achieve a constant factor approximation to
the optimal (unconstrained) social welfare. In particular, the approximation ratio is independent of
the number of advertisers in the system. In this respect, these allocation algorithms greatly surpass
the guarantees achieved in previous work. In fact, our algorithms achieve a near optimal tradeoff
between fairness and social welfare under a mild assumption on the value stability constraint. We
also extend our results to broader notions of fairness that we call subset fairness.
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1. Introduction
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in today’s society and can arguably have far-
ranging social, economic, and political ramifications in many different contexts. One such context
is access to sponsored information such as advertisements on social media, search pages, and other
websites. It has been well documented that online advertisement can exhibit skewed delivery: users
that differ on sensitive attributes such as race, gender, age, religion, and national origin can receive
very different allocations of ads (see, e.g., [Swe13; DTD15; AP16; AST17; LT19; KT19; Ali+19]).
For example, certain employment jobs on Facebook have been found to exclusively target men or
exclude older people; and housing ads have been found to exclude users based on race [AST17;
AP16; KT19].
There are two main sources of unfairness in digital ads. The first is explicit or implicit targeting of
users based on sensitive attributes by the advertisers. This source of unfairness can be mitigated by
examining each advertiser’s targeting approach separately. Indeed, in response to a lawsuit brought
on by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and ProPublica against Facebook
on discrimination in housing ads, Facebook’s first action was to disallow advertisers to target users
based on sensitive attributes [KT19]. However it has been further documented that unfairness can
persist even in the absence of inappropriate targeting of users [Ali+19]. The second, more subtle,
source of unfairness is the ad delivery mechanism that determines for each user which ad to display
based on advertisers’ bids, budgets, relevance of the ads to the user, etc. Recent empirical studies
[LT19; Ali+19] have observed that even when each advertiser’s targeting parameters are inclusive,
skewed delivery can arise as a result of the ad auction mechanism.
In this paper, we study the design of ad auctions with a fairness constraint. Our
approach is inspired by the notion of individual fairness developed by Dwork et al. [Dwo+12],
which requires that similar users should be treated similarly. In the context of sponsored content,
this translates into requiring that similar users should be served a similar mix of ads. Our work
addresses the second source of unfairness described above: if two users receive similar bids from all
advertisers, then we require that they receive similar ad allocations. In other words, the auction
does not introduce any further unfairness than what may be present already in advertisers’ bids.
Fairness as a stability condition. We consider a setting with k advertisers and design an allo-
cation algorithm that takes as input a value vector v = (v1, v2, · · · , vk) and returns a distribution
over [k], a(v) ∈ ∆([k]). vi denotes the value that advertiser i assigns to the user and ai(v) denotes
the probability with which the corresponding ad is displayed for the user.1 Our fairness condition
on allocations is a kind of stability condition: it requires that for any two value vectors v and v′
that are component-wise close to each other, i.e. vi
′ ∈ [ 1λvi, λvi] for all i ∈ [k] and some λ ≥ 1,
the allocations a(v) and a(v′) are component-wise close to each other, i.e. ai(v′) ∈ ai(v) ± f(λ)
for all i ∈ [k]. Here f is an externally specified function that governs the strength of the fairness
guarantee. We call f the fairness constraint, and we call an allocation algorithm satisfying the
above guarantee value stable with respect to the constraint f .2
Our main contribution is to develop a new class of allocation algorithms that provides a near-
optimal tradeoff between fairness and performance. Specifically, given any fairness constraint f , we
can find an allocation algorithm within this class that is value stable with respect to f and obtains
nearly the best worst-case social welfare across all f -value-stable algorithms. Before we describe
our results in more detail, let us discuss some aspects of our fairness model.
1We focus on designing allocations that are monotone increasing in values and can therefore be implemented in a
truthful fashion. Accordingly, we do not distinguish between advertisers’ values and bids.
2In previous work [CIJ20] we considered a similar model of fairness in ad auctions but formalized the fairness
constraint in a slightly different manner. Results in this paper are directly comparable to those in [CIJ20], and we
make the connection explicit in Section 2.1.
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This approach of expressing fairness as a stability constraint offers several benefits. First, it
enables a clear separation of responsibility between the auctioneer and the advertisers, which can
simplify the design of both of these components of the ad auction pipeline. We envision that an
auditor would check whether advertisers are following fairness guidelines. As a result, the auctioneer
only needs to ensure that the allocation is fair when the advertisers’ reported values are fair, but
is required to provide no fairness guarantee when the values themselves are unfair. Second, the
auctioneer can provide this guarantee without access to the specifics of fairness requirements across
users. One criticism of the notion of individual fairness is its reliance on an appropriate similarity
metric on users that captures exactly what features can be used to differentiate between users.
Where does this metric come from and who has the authority to certify that this is the right metric
to use in a given context? Indeed the similarity metric itself may be sensitive information that
is unavailable to the auctioneer or illegal to use directly. Our approach allows the auctioneer to
provide a meaningful fairness guarantee without knowing or using the similarity metric. In effect,
the similarity metric is encoded in the advertisers’ reported values when those values are fair.
Observe that we measure closeness in values as a ratio, and consequently our stability notion
is scale free. On the other hand, we measure closeness in allocations as a difference, specifically
the `∞ distance between the respective distributions. This corresponds to the notion of multiple-
task fairness defined by Dwork and Ilvento [DI19] in the context of multi-dimensional allocation
algorithms.
The tension between fairness and social welfare. Fairness by itself is easy to achieve: by
disregarding values entirely and serving the same mix of ads to every user, the auctioneer can
trivially achieve perfect fairness. However, the allocation thus produced brings little benefit to the
users or the advertisers. Is it possible to achieve fairness while also guaranteeing a good quality
allocation? In this paper we study the tradeoff between fairness and social welfare (that is, the
expected value of the ad served to the user).
Observe that standard optimal auction formats are not value stable. Consider the highest bid
wins auction, for example. On the two similar value vectors v = (1, 1 − ) and v′ = (1 − , 1),
this auction produces completely different allocations. This might correspond to a situation where
different kinds of job ads are competing over two users with similar qualifications and where,
because of small variations in values, the highest bid wins auction shows one user far less desirable
ads than the other. Thus, the highest bid wins auction greatly exaggerates minor, subtle differences
in input into huge swings in output, whereas value stability requires that changing any individual
value gradually changes all allocations gradually and smoothly.
A natural candidate for value stability is the Proportional Allocation (PA) algorithm: given the
value vector v, we assign each ad i to the user with probability vi/
∑
j vj . It is straightforward to
observe that changing each value by a factor of λ changes each allocation multiplicatively by at
most λ2.3 Unfortunately, the social welfare of PA degrades as the number of advertisers increases.
Suppose, for example, that there are k + 1 advertisers; the first one places a value of 1 on the user
whereas all the others value the user at x < 1. Then, PA assigns the first ad to the user with
probability 1/(1 + xk) and obtains a social welfare of (1 + x2k)/(1 + xk). When x = 1/
√
k, this is
a factor of
√
k off from the optimal social welfare of 1. Other proportional allocation algorithms
that assign allocations in proportion to other functions of values4 suffer from the same problem:
their worst case approximation ratio goes to zero as the number k of advertisers goes to infinity. Is
it possible to obtain better social welfare while maintaining fairness?
3We showed in [CIJ20] that PA achieves the additive form of fairness defined above with f(λ) = (λ− 1)/(λ+ 1).
The strength of the fairness guarantee can be changed by allocating each ad with probability proportional to an
appropriate function of the corresponding value.
4This class includes, for example, the exponential algorithm from differential privacy literature [MT07].
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Let us list some other desirable properties for allocation algorithms. First our goal is to design
prior-free algorithms that neither assume knowledge nor the existence of any prior over value
vectors and, in particular, satisfy the fairness constraint for all possible pairs of value vectors, and
not just those that arise with non-zero probability. We defer the discussion of benefits of a prior-
free design to Section 2. In keeping with this prior-free framework, we measure the performance
of our algorithms with respect to social welfare in the worst case over all possible value vectors.
Finally, while these are not explicit constraints within our framework, the algorithms we design
are scale-free in that scaling the values by a uniform factor leaves the allocation unchanged; and
anonymous across advertisers in that permuting the values permutes the allocations.
Our contribution: Inverse proportional allocation. In this paper we introduce a new family
of allocation rules that we call Inverse Proportional Allocation (IPA). This new family of
mechanisms achieves fairness guarantees similar to those of PA, while obtaining a constant factor
approximation to the unfair optimal social welfare. In particular, the approximation factor achieved
by IPA does not depend on the number of advertisers k. We show, in fact, that Inverse Proportional
Allocation achieves a near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and social welfare for any stability
constraint satisfying a mild assumption.
Informally, our auction begins by allocating each ad fully (but infeasibly) to the user. It then
“takes away” the over-assignment from the ads in proportion to some decreasing function of the
advertisers’ bids until a total allocation probability of 1 is achieved. The choice of the decreasing
function depends on the strength of the desired fairness constraint. To understand how IPA works,
let us again consider the above example with k + 1 advertisers where the first advertiser reports
a value of 1 for the user and the remaining k advertisers report a value of x < 1. In PA the first
advertiser gets an allocation that is a factor of 1/x larger than that of the remaining advertisers,
but because of the large number of advertisers gets a net allocation of about 1/(xk). Under IPA,
on the other hand, the “unallocated” probabilities 1− ai(v) are proportional to the inverse of the
advertisers’ values. The first advertiser’s allocation is therefore no less than 1 − x no matter how
large k is.
More broadly, we study the class of IPA algorithms that assign “unallocated amounts” (i.e. one
minus the probability of allocation) to each advertiser in proportion to vi
−` for some parameter
` > 0. We show that for every ` > 0, the corresponding IPA algorithm is value stable with respect
to the fairness constraint f`(λ) = 1−λ−2`. Furthermore, this algorithm achieves the optimal welfare
across the class of all prior-free allocation algorithms that are value stable with respect to f`.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For any ` ∈ (0,∞), Inverse Proportional Allocation with the appropriate
parameter settings is value-stable with respect to f`(λ) = 1−λ−2`. Its worst case approximation ratio
for social welfare, α`, is 3/4 at ` = 1 regardless of the number of advertisers; and, when ` → ∞,
the approximation ratio approaches 1.5 No prior free allocation algorithm that is value-stable with
respect to f` can achieve a better approximation ratio than α` + 1/k.
When we further expand the class of allocation algorithms to include IPA mixed in with the
uniform allocation, we achieve near-optimality against arbitrary fairness constraints f that satisfy
a mild condition (namely that f(x)/ log x is non-increasing6). We show that for any such fairness
constraint, if there exists a prior free allocation algorithm that is value stable and achieves an
approximation ratio of α, then IPA with an appropriate setting of the parameters achieves value
stablility and an Ω(α/(1 + log(1/α)) approximation ratio.
5Approximation factors are always at most 1, and larger approximations factors are better than smaller ones.
6This condition is essentially without loss of generality and follows from the observation that any fairness constraint
f must satisfy f(xy) ≤ f(x) + f(y) for every x, y ≥ 1. This is because for any value vectors v and v′ that are within
a multiplicative xy of each other, there exists another value function v˜ such that v and v˜ are within a multiplicative
factor of x of each other and v′ and v˜ are within y.
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Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Let f : [1,∞]→ [0, 1] be any non-decreasing function such that f(x)/ log x
is non-increasing. Suppose there exists an allocation algorithm that is value stable with respect to f
and achieves a worst case approximation factor of α. Then there is an IPA algorithm that is value
stable with respect to f and achieves a worst case approximation factor of Ω(α/(1 + log(1/α))).
Altogether, IPA is a clean and simple family of allocation algorithms that provides value stability
guarantees for a full spectrum of possible stability constraints while also obtaining a near-optimal
approximation to social welfare.
1.1. Further extensions. We also show our results can be extended to the following two settings.
Fairness across different categories of ads. So far in our discussion we have assumed that
there is an single notion of similarity across users that all advertisers are required to respect. In
reality, platforms often service many different categories of advertisers (for example job advertisers
and credit advertisers) that may be subject to different notions of similarity over the users. These
advertisers all compete against each other for the same users. In [CIJ20], we proposed fairness
definitions for the multi-category setting that combine individual fairness with envy-freeness. Our
algorithms from this work can be utilized within the multi-category framework in [CIJ20] to achieve
significantly improved tradeoffs between fairness and social welfare for the multi-category setting.
We discuss this extension in Appendix A.
Total-variation and subset fairness. In [CIJ20] we showed that PA satisfies a stronger fairness
guarantee called total variation fairness: the distributions over ads assigned to similar users are not
only close under `∞ distance, but also close under `1 or total variation distance. Equivalently, total-
variation fairness provides guarantees over any subset of ads, rather than just a single ad. However,
we observe that our family of IPA auctions does not always satisfy total variation fairness. Indeed
it appears to be challenging to satisfy this stronger fairness property while also guaranteeing a
constant factor approximation in social welfare. In Section 6, we show, however, that IPA can
be adapted to achieve an intermediate fairness guarantee that we call subset fairness: fairness is
guaranteed over a restricted collection of subsets of advertisers.
1.2. Other related work. While algorithmic fairness is by now an established area of study, the-
oretical work on fairness in ad auctions is relatively new. There are two complementary sides to
the fairness problem in the context of ad auctions. As in our work, Celis et al. [CMV19] study the
problem from the viewpoint of the platform—redesigning the ad auction so as to achieve fair out-
comes. They provide an optimization framework within which, given an explicit population of users
and bids over them, a platform can compute the optimal fair assignment of ads to users. Celis et al.
focus on algorithmic techniques for solving the optimization problem, comparing the performance
of their algorithm to the optimal fair solution; whereas our focus in this work is on comparing the
performance of our algorithm against the unfair optimum and therefore characterizing the cost of
fairness.
The complementary viewpoint is that of the advertisers—designing bidding and targetting strate-
gies that preemptively correct for unfairness introduced by the platform mechanism. Nasr and
Tschantz [NT20] design bidding strategies for advertisers aimed at obtaining parity in impressions
across fixed categories (such as gender). Gelauff et al. [GGMY20] likewise design targetting strate-
gies aimed at obtaining parity in outcomes or conversions across different demographic groups. A
key point of difference between these works and ours is that they focus on the notion of group
fairness whereas our work considers individual fairness guarantees.
Besides these works, the tradeoff between fairness and social welfare has also been studied in
other contexts such as classification problems (see, e.g., Hu and Chen [HC20]).
Fair division. Complementary to algorithmic fairness, there is an extensive literature on fair
division that also considers the tension between fairness and social welfare. A major difference
between the algorithmic fairness and envy-freeness is that algorithmic fairness generally focuses on
FAIRNESS IN AD AUCTIONS THROUGH INVERSE PROPORTIONALITY 5
individual qualifications, while envy-freeness generally focuses on individual preferences, though
recent work [CIJ20; KKRY20; BDNP19; Zaf+17] has proposed definitions which combine aspects
of envy-freeness and algorithmic fairness notions.
1.3. Outline for the rest of the paper. In Section 2, we present our model for fair ad auctions
and describe the connection between value stability and individual fairness. In Section 3, we
describe Inverse Proportional Allocation algorithms and state our main results on social welfare
and value stability. In Section 4, we prove the value stability results. In Section 5 we consider
extensions of the IPA mixed in with uniform allocation, and show that this family of allocation
algorithms achieves near optimal tradeoffs between social welfare and value stability. In Section 6,
we consider the stronger notion of subset fairness and develop fair allocation algorithms with social
welfare that degrades with the complexity of the subset collection.
2. Model and definitions
We use a simple stylized model for ad auctions. Every time a user arrives on the platform, k
advertisers bid for the chance to display their ad in the single ad slot available. We assume that the
platform employs a truthful direct auction to determine which ad to display. In particular, when
the user arrives, each advertiser i reports a value vi for the user. The auction takes the value vector
v = [v1, · · · , vk] as input and returns a distribution a(v) = [a1(v), · · · , ak(v)] over the advertisers.
We drop the argument v when it is clear from the context. With probability ai, advertiser i is
picked and the corresponding ad is displayed for the user. We call the function a(v) the allocation
function.
An allocation function a is truthful if there exists an accompanying payment function p(v) that
incentivizes advertisers to bid their true values. Such a payment function exists if and only if for all
i, ai(vi, v−i) is a monotone non-decreasing function of the argument vi; payments can be computed
using the standard payment identity. Henceforth we focus on weakly monotone allocation functions.
We briefly discuss the computation of payments using the payment identity in Appendix B.
Value stability. In order to prevent the allocation function from introducing unfairness into the
system, we require that our allocation is value-stable. If two users have similar values from all
advertisers, then they must receive similar allocations. That is, we require that for two value
vectors v and v′ that are component-wise close in a multiplicative sense, the allocations a(v) and
a(v′) must be close in an additive sense. Formally:
Definition 2.1. An allocation is value-stable with respect to function f : [1,∞] → [0, 1] if the
following condition is satisfied for every pair of value vectors v and v′:
|ai(v)− ai(v′)| ≤ f(λ) for all i ∈ [k], where λ is defined as max
i∈[k]
(
max
{
vi
vi′
,
vi
′
vi
})
.
The function f governs the strength of the value stability constraint. When two value vectors are
identical, the allocation should be the same, so f(1) = 0. When two value vectors are arbitrarily
different, the allocation should be permitted to be arbitrarily different, so f(∞) = 1. For interme-
diate values, observe that the smaller f is, the tighter is the constraint on the allocation, and the
harder it should be for the auction to achieve value stability. Following [CIJ20], we characterize
the strength of the fairness constraint on values by considering an explicit family F of functions
parameterized by ` ∈ (0,∞): f`(x) = 1− x−2`.7
7The precise form of the value-stability in [CIJ20] is actually 1−x
−2`
1+x−2` . The two functions are related to each other
within small constant factors, and the form we use is mathematically more convenient for our proofs.
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Simplicity through prior-free design. Observe that our notion of value stability is defined over all
possible pairs of value vectors v and v′, and not just those that arise in a real-world context. This
is intentional: as discussed in the introduction, we require the allocation algorithm to be prior-
free in the sense of not knowing or even assuming a prior over value vectors. While utilizing a
prior can potentially improve the algorithm’s performance, there are several reasons for preferring
a prior-free design: (1) prior-free algorithms are generally simpler than prior-dependent ones; (2) a
single prior-free algorithm can be used in multiple different contexts without modification, and is
therefore robust to changes in the market; (3) in the context of fair ad allocation, parts of the prior
may be sensitive information that is inappropriate or illegal to use; and, most importantly, (4) we
would like to ensure fairness guarantees even if the prior is misspecified, or if new value vectors
arise that were not expected to be in the support.
Social welfare. In this work we focus on the objective of social welfare maximization. The social
welfare achieved by the allocation vector a on value vector v is given by a · v. The maximum
social welfare achievable for any value vector v is therefore maxi vi. As discussed previously,
welfare maximizing allocation functions generally do not satisfy value stability, so we look towards
approximation. In keeping with the prior-free design of the allocation function, we measure its
performance in the worst case.
Definition 2.2. An allocation function a achieves an α-approximation to social welfare for α ≤ 1
if for all value vectors v we have a(v) · v ≥ α ·maxi vi.
2.1. Fairness and value stability. We now discuss how fairness connects to value stability.
[CIJ20] introduces a model for ad allocation where users are drawn from a universe U endowed
with a distance metric d that captures similarities between different users: the shorter the distance
between two users, the more similar they are to each other. The model employs the notion of
individual fairness from [Dwo+12] which requires, informally, that similar users should receive
similar outcomes. When the outcomes are probability distributions, Dwork and Ilvento [DI19]
propose using the `∞ distance between difference distributions as a measure of (dis-)similarity in
outcomes.
Definition 2.3 (Paraphrased from [Dwo+12] and [DI19]). A function A : U → O assigning users
to outcomes from a set O is said to be individually fair with respect to distance metrics d over
U and D over O, if for all u1, u2 ∈ U we have D(A(u1),A(u2)) ≤ d(u1, u2).
An allocation function a : U → ∆([k]) satisfies multiple-task fairness with respect to distance
metric d if for all u1, u2 ∈ U and i ∈ [k], we have |ai(u1)− ai(u2)| ≤ d(u1, u2).
Like in this work, [CIJ20] studies the design of allocation algorithms that return fair outcomes
when the advertisers bid fairly. [CIJ20] connects fairness in advertisers’ values and allocations to
the distance metric over users through a constraint on advertisers’ values called the “bid ratio
constraint”. Informally, if two users are close to each other under the distance metric d, then all
advertisers are required to bid multiplicatively similar amounts on the users.
Definition 2.4 ([CIJ20]). A bid ratio constraint is a continuous function h : [0, 1]→ [1,∞] with
h(0) = 1 and h(1) =∞. We say that the value function vi : U → [0,∞) of advertiser i satisfies the
bid ratio constraint h with respect to metric d if for all u1, u2 ∈ U : 1h(d(u1,u2)) ≤
vi(u1)
vi(u2)
≤ h(d(u1, u2)).
[CIJ20] then proceed to design allocation algorithms that achieve multiple task fairness with
respect to the underlying metric d as long as the values reported to the algorithm satisfy an
appropriate bid ratio constraint. There is a close connection between our approach and that of
[CIJ20]. An allocation algorithm is value stable if and only if it satisfies multiple task fairness
whenever paired with value vectors satisfying an appropriate bid ratio constraint.
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Fact 2.5. Let h : [0, 1]→ [1,∞] be a strictly increasing function with h(0) = 1 and h(1) =∞. Let
f : [1,∞] → [0, 1] be the inverse of h. Then an allocation function a is value stable with respect
to function f if and only if over any universe U endowed with distance metric d and any set of
value vectors assigned to users in the universe that satisfy the bid ratio constraint h, the function
a applied to the value vectors produces a multiple task fair allocation with respect to d.
3. The Inverse Proportional Allocation algorithm and our results
The main contribution of this paper is a new class of allocation functions that we call inverse-
proportional (IPA) allocation. In this section we introduce the algorithm and outline its properties.
Let us begin with an informal description of our mechanism. Recall that in a proportional allocation
algorithm, the allocations ai are proportional to (some function of) the values vi. In the inverse
proportional allocation algorithm, we set the unallocated amounts 1−ai to be proportional to some
decreasing function of the values vi. Specifically, the algorithm is parameterized by a decreasing
function g : R≥0 → (0,∞], where g(0) =∞ and limx→∞ g(x) = 0. We then deduct allocation from
advertiser i in proportion to g(vi).
We will now describe the algorithm more precisely in three different but equivalent ways, which
will be useful for our analysis.
Formulation 1: We start with the most direct formulation. Let v be a value vector. For t ≥ 0
and i ∈ [k], let yi(t) = max(0, 1− tg(vi)), and y(t) =
∑
i∈[k] yi(t). Observe that y(t) is a decreasing
function with y(0) = k. Then, there is a unique value of t for which y(t) = 1. Let t∗ > 0 be this
value. Define a(v) = (y1(t
∗), · · · , yk(t∗)). (Intuitively, we start with an allocation of 1 to every
advertiser, corresponding to t = 0. We gradually raise t, decreasing the allocations in proportion
to g(vi). When an allocation reaches 0, it remains 0. The process stops when the total allocated
mass is precisely equal to 1.)
Formulation 2: We next describe an algorithmic version that describes how to find t∗. For
i ∈ [k] let wi denote the unallocated amounts to be assigned to each advertiser. Observe that over
any set S of advertisers, the total allocated amount is at most 1 and therefore the total unallocated
amount is at least |S| − 1. The wi’s split this amount in proportion to the g(vi)’s. However, there
is a problem: when the set S is large and vi is very small, it may turn out to be the case that
wi > 1, and 1−wi is negative. In this case, we must assign an allocation of 0 to the corresponding
advertiser. Formally, we start with S being the set of all advertisers. At each step we determine
the weights wi(S) as below; we remove from S any advertisers j with wj(S) > 1; we recurse on the
remaining set of advertisers until all wi(S) values are ≤ 1.
wi(S) := (|S| − 1) g(vi)∑
j∈S g(vj)
Formulation 3: Our final formulation is a computationally efficient algorithm implementing
the above idea. See Algorithm 1. The algorithm runs in time O(k log k).
Remark 3.1. In Algorithm 1, when k = 2, the condition in Step 6 is never satisfied, so both
advertisers will receive nonzero allocations if both of their values are nonzero. Similarly, whenever
k ≥ 2, at least two advertisers will be assigned nonzero allocation probabilities when there are at
least two advertisers with nonzero values.
3.1. Incentive Compatibility. Observe that IPA is a prior free algorithm. We will now formally
prove incentive compatibility. The following lemma shows that the allocation assigned to any
advertiser is weakly monotone increasing in her own value and weakly monotone decreasing in
other advertisers’ values.
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Algorithm 1: Inverse Proportional Allocation (IPA) parameterized by function g
Input : Function g : R≥0 → (0,∞] with g(0) =∞ and limx→∞ g(x) = 0. Values v1, . . . , vk.
1 Sort the values so that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ . . . ≤ vk.
2 if vk = 0 then
3 Set ai = 1/k for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and return a.
4 end
5 Initialize s = −1 + min ({i ∈ [k] | vi > 0}).
6 while (k − s− 1)g(vs+1) ≥
∑k
j=s+1 g(vj) do
7 Set s = s+ 1.
8 end
9 For i ≤ s set ai = 0 and for i > s set ai = 1− (k − s− 1) g(vi)∑k
j=s+1 g(vj)
.
Lemma 3.2. For any value vector v and any i ∈ [k], let v′ = (vi′, v−i) be another value vector
that differs from v only in coordinate i with vi > vi
′. Then it holds that ai(v) ≥ ai(v′) and
aj(v) ≤ aj(v′) for all j 6= i.
Proof. Consider determining the allocations a(v) and a(v′) using Formulation 1 of the IPA de-
scribed above. Let y(t) and y′(t) denote the sums of allocations at a particular value of t for v and
v′ respectively. Recall that g is a decreasing function, and so, g(vi) ≤ g(vi′). Then, at any t, we
have y(t) ≥ y′(t). Therefore, the value of t∗ that defines the final allocations is smaller under v
than under v′. This immediately implies aj(v) ≤ aj(v′) for all j 6= i. Then ai(v) ≥ ai(v′) follows
by recalling that the allocations sum up to 1. 
Lemma 3.2, by guaranteeing monotonicity, implies that the algorithm can be implemented as an
incentive-compatible mechanism using an appropriately designed payment rule. For g(x) = 1/x,
the payments can be specified explicitly; see Appendix B.
3.2. Choosing the function g. An important choice in the design space for IPA algorithms is
the choice of the function g. This choice depends on the tradeoff between the stability condition
we want to satisfy and the social welfare approximation we desire. However, there is an additional
property that should be satisfied. Since we focus on prior free design and worst case analysis, the
algorithm should be scale free in that when all values are scaled by a common factor, the allocation
remains the same.
Consider, for example, the value vectors v = (1, x) and v′ = (y, xy). The allocation produced
by IPA with parameter g in the two cases is, respectively,
a =
(
1− g(1)
g(1) + g(x)
, 1− g(x)
g(1) + g(x)
)
and a′ =
(
1− g(y)
g(y) + g(xy)
, 1− g(xy)
g(y) + g(xy)
)
In order for these allocations to be the same, modulo normalization, it must hold that g(xy) =
g(x)g(y) for all x, y > 0. Under very mild assumptions on g (e.g. continuity), the only solution to
this functional equation is g(x) = x−` where ` ∈ (0,∞). Henceforth we focus on IPA parameterized
by this family of polynomial functions.
Definition 3.3. For ` ∈ (0,∞), the Inverse Proportional Allocation Algorithm with pa-
rameter ` is Algorithm 1 with g defined as g(x) = x−` for x ∈ [0,∞).
This family of polynomial functions encompasses the entire range of tradeoffs between value
stability and social welfare. To see this, consider IPA at the extremes. As ` → 0, IPA with
g(x) = x−` ignores the value vector entirely and always assigns an equal allocation of 1/k to each
advertiser. This algorithm achieves the strongest possible value stability condition, with f(λ) = 0
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for all λ ∈ [1,∞]. However, this value stability guarantees comes at the expense of social welfare:
the approximation ratio approaches 0 as k → ∞. As ` → ∞, IPA with g(x) = x−` becomes
a highest-bid-wins allocation rule. This algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of 1 at the
expense of value stability: f(λ) approaches 1 for every λ > 1. When ` ∈ (0,∞), IPA with
g(x) = x−` interpolates between these two extremes, achieving different tradeoffs between social
welfare and value-stability.
3.3. The value stability of IPA. We begin our analysis of the IPA by studying its value stability
properties. The following theorem shows that the IPA with an appropriate choice of parameter
` > 0 achieves value stability with respect to the class of functions f`(λ) = 1− λ−2`.
Theorem 3.4. For any ` > 0 and any number k > 0 of advertisers, the inverse proportional
allocation algorithm with parameter ` is value stable with respect to any function f that satisfies
f(λ) ≥ f`(λ) = 1− λ−2` for all λ ∈ [1,∞).
As briefly discussed above, the family of functions f` essentially represents the large spectrum
of possible value stability conditions. See Figure 1a for a depiction of f` at different values of `. In
particular, f0 is 0 everywhere and represents one extreme – a fixed allocation; f∞ is 1 everywhere and
represents the other extreme – an unconstrained allocation. Furthermore, for any non-decreasing
function f : [1,∞) → [0, 1] with limx→∞ f(x) = 1, there exists an ` with f(x) ≥ f`(x) for all
x ∈ [1,∞). Therefore, for any such stability constraint f , there exists a value for ` so that IPA
with parameter ` is stable with respect to f .8
We also show a converse of Theorem 3.4. In particular, we observe that for stability constraints
f that do not fall into the class of functions {f`}, the best way to parameterize IPA is to choose
the parameter ` corresponding to the function f` that most closely approximates f from below.
Theorem 3.5. For any function f and parameter ` > 0 such that over any number of advertisers
k > 0, the IPA with parameter ` is value stable with respect to f , it holds that f(x) ≥ f`(x) for all
x ≥ 1.
The proofs of Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 are deferred to Section 4.
3.4. The social welfare of IPA. Next we analyze the worst case performance of the IPA for
social welfare.
Theorem 3.6. For any ` ∈ (0,∞), the inverse proportional allocation algorithm with parameter `
obtains a worst case approximation ratio for social welfare of at least:
α` := min
x∈(0,1)
(1− x` + x`+1) = 1− 1
`+ 1
(
`
`+ 1
)`
The approximation ratio of IPA is easy to analyze and we present the argument here in its
entirety. The proof essentially shows that value vectors of the form [1, x, x, . . . , x] for x < 1 are
the worst case with respect to social welfare for IPA. At such a value vector, each advertiser with
value x gets some non-zero allocation, which limits the mass that is placed on the highest value
advertiser.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Consider any value vector v and order the values so that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vk.
Since multiplicative scaling does not affect the allocation or the approximation ratio, we may assume
without loss of generality that v1 = 1. Then, the optimal social welfare over this value vector is
also 1. We may also assume v2 > 0, since otherwise the algorithm puts the entire allocation mass
on the highest value.
8In Section 5.2, we construct a variant of inverse proportional allocation that can better handle when
limx→∞ f(x) 6= 1 and/or when the convergence to this limit is slow.
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Consider the set of non-zero allocations. We know that this set is of the form {1, . . . ,m} for
some 1 ≤ m ≤ k. The social welfare achieved by IPA can be written as:
m∑
i=1
viai ≥ v1a1 + vm(1− a1) = a1 + vm(1− a1).
To analyze this expression, we first recall that a1 = 1 − (m − 1)/
∑m
i=1 vi
−`. Observe that since
advertiser m receives a nonzero allocation, we know that
1 ≥ 1− am = (m− 1) vm
−`∑m
i=1 vi
−` , so,
m− 1∑m
i=1 vi
−` ≤ vm`.
This means that a1 ≥ 1−vm`, and the approximation ratio can be lower bounded by 1−vm`+vm`+1.
The lowest value of this expression is achieved at vm =
`
`+1 , implying the bound claimed in the
theorem. 
Observe that the approximation achieved by IPA is independent of the number k of advertisers.
This is one of the main features that distinguishes IPA from the family of proportional allocation
(PA) algorithms. PA necessarily exhibit worse and worse performance as the number of advertisers
grows because every advertiser gets some non-zero fraction of the total allocation; IPA, on the
hand, achieves good performance even when k is large by better handling advertisers that have
small values relative to the largest value.
Figure 1b displays the dependence of the approximation ratio on the parameter `. The ratio
increases with `, and observe that when ` = 1, the algorithm already obtains at least 3/4 of
the maximum social welfare. The figure also exhibits a comparison of IPA’s performance against
that of the proportional allocation algorithm of [CIJ20] parameterized to satisfy the same value
stability constraint f`. Observe that PA’s approximation ratio worsens as the number of advertisers
increases. The differences are more pronounced at smaller values of `, which is arguably the more
interesting range of values. Our improvement makes these algorithms practical in real-life settings
where platforms service a large number of advertisers in a given category (e.g. employment).
Finally, we remark that IPA with parameter ` = 1 arises as a full-information Nash equilibrium of
an algorithm that allocates proportionally to bids with an all-pay payment rule. These mechanisms
are considered in [JT04; CV16; CST16], and, in this context, the approximation ratio was previously
shown to be at least 3/4, the same bound we obtain. Our analysis is different and much simpler
than those other works because, in particular, it does not require determining equilibrium strategies.
Moreover, our analysis generalizes to ` 6= 1.
4. An analysis of Inverse Proportional Allocation
We will now prove the value stability of Inverse Proportional Allocation, restated below.
Theorem 3.4. For any ` > 0 and any number k > 0 of advertisers, the inverse proportional
allocation algorithm with parameter ` is value stable with respect to any function f that satisfies
f(λ) ≥ f`(λ) = 1− λ−2` for all λ ∈ [1,∞).
Theorem 3.5. For any function f and parameter ` > 0 such that over any number of advertisers
k > 0, the IPA with parameter ` is value stable with respect to f , it holds that f(x) ≥ f`(x) for all
x ≥ 1.
To prove Theorem 3.4, we need to understand how the allocation changes as the value vector
changes by a small multiplicative amount. There are two main components to this analysis. First,
given a value vector v, we identify among all value vectors multiplicatively close to v the one that
changes a particular advertiser i’s allocation to the greatest extent. The second step is to then
bound the corresponding change to the allocation. The main challenge in doing so is that as the
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(a) Value stability conditions f` (b) Approximation ratio
Figure 1. Value-stability constraints and approximation ratio for IPA
value vector changes, the set of advertisers that get non-zero allocation also changes. This makes
it difficult to directly compare the two allocations.
Before jumping into the main proof, let us consider the special case of k = 2 advertisers. This
setting will illustrate the first component of our analysis as well as provide intuition for how the
stability constraint f` relates to the parameter setting of IPA. In this setting, both advertisers
always receive non-zero allocation and it becomes possible to write the allocation explicitly:
a(v) =
[
1− v1
−`
v1−` + v2−`
, 1− v2
−`
v1−` + v2−`
]
=
[
v1
`
v1` + v2`
,
v2
`
v1` + v2`
]
.
Now fix a value λ ∈ [1,∞) and consider any two value vectors v and v′ with v′1 ∈ [1/λ, λ]v1 and
v′2 ∈ [1/λ, λ]v2. We need to show that |a1 − a′1| ≤ f`(λ) = 1− λ−2`, which implies the same bound
over |a2 − a′2|. Let us fix the vector v and construct a worst-case value vector v′ such that a′1 is
as small as possible while respecting the multiplicative condition on the values. The monotonicity
properties given in Lemma 3.2 enable us to identify such a value vector: v′ = [v1/λ, λv2]. For this
“worst-case” choice, we have:
a1 − a′1 =
v1
`
v1` + v2`
− (v
′
1)
`
(v′1)` + (v′2)`
=
1
1 + (v2/v1)`
− 1
1 + λ2`(v2/v1)`
.
Treating v2/v1 as a free variable, we see that the expression is maximized at v2/v1 = 1/λ and we
get,
a1 − a′1 ≤
1
1 + λ−`
− 1
1 + λ`
=
λ` − 1
λ` + 1
≤ 1− λ−`.
Recall that f`(λ) = 1− λ−2` and so the theorem follows for the case of k = 2.
For the general case, we carry out a similar analysis. We fix the value vector v and a parameter
λ ∈ [1,∞), and find a worst-case value vector v′ that is multiplicatively close to v but changes
the allocation by the greatest amount. The challenge is that in order to write down an explicit
expression for some advertiser’s allocation we need to fix the set of advertisers that obtains non-zero
allocation. This set changes as the value vector changes.
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Our analysis is based on two ideas. The first idea is to examine the formulation of IPA in
Algorithm 1 and consider how the allocations change if we terminate the while loop in Step 6 early.
Let S be the set of agents that receive non-zero allocations in the algorithm. We argue that if we
terminate the while loop early, “serving” a larger set of agents than S, then agents in S receive
higher allocations. The second idea is when comparing allocations for the two vectors v and v′, if
we pretend that the same set of advertisers are “served” under both the value vectors (with some
of these allocations potentially being negative), then these allocations are additively close. We
formalize these properties in the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. Let v be any value vector with the advertisers reordered so that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vk.
Let S = [m] be the set of advertisers with nonzero allocation returned by the Inverse Proportional
Allocation algorithm parameterized by function g on v. Then for any m′ with m ≤ m′ ≤ k and any
i ∈ [m],
1− (m− 1) g(vi)∑
j∈[m] g(vj)
≤ 1− (m′ − 1) g(vi)∑
j∈[m′] g(vj)
.
Lemma 4.2. Let λ ∈ [1,∞) and g(x) = x−` for all x ≥ 0. Let S ⊆ [k] be an arbitrary set of
advertisers, and i be an advertiser in S. Suppose that value vectors v and v′ satisfy v′i = vi/λ
2 and
v′j = vj for all j ∈ S with j 6= i. Then we have:
max
(
0, 1− (|S| − 1) g(vi)∑
j∈S g(vj)
)
−max
(
0, 1− (|S| − 1) g(v
′
i)∑
j∈S g(v
′
j)
)
≤ f`(λ).
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 along with Lemma 3.2 provide us with the necessary ingredients to prove
Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let λ ∈ [1,∞), and let v be an arbitrary value vector. We will focus on the
allocation to advertiser 1 is a1, and consider a value vector v
′ with v′i ∈ [1/λ, λ]vi for all i ∈ [k] that
assigns the minimum possible allocation to 1. Since the IPA is a scale-free allocation algorithm,
we may equivalently focus on value vectors v′ with v′i ∈ [1/λ2, 1]vi for all i ∈ [k]. Lemma 3.2 then
implies that the allocation to 1 is minimized at v′1 = v1/λ2 and v′−1 = v−1.
Let S be the set of advertisers receiving nonzero allocation from IPA on v, and let S′ be the
corresponding set for v′. Let a and a′ be the corresponding allocations. By Lemma 3.2, a′i ≥ ai for
all i 6= 1 and a′1 ≤ a1. Therefore, S ⊆ S′ ∪ {1}. We want to show: a1 − a′1 ≤ f`(λ). We now break
up our analysis into three cases.
Case 1: 1 6∈ S. In this case, a1 = 0 and a1 − a′1 ≤ 0, so the statement trivially holds.
Case 2: 1 ∈ S and 1 ∈ S′. In this case we have S ⊆ S′, and a1, a′1 > 0. So, by Lemma 4.1 we
obtain:
a1 = 1− (|S| − 1) g(v1)∑
j∈S g(vj)
≤ 1− (|S′| − 1) g(v1)∑
j∈S′ g(vj)
.
Furthermore, Lemma 4.2 implies:
1− (|S′| − 1) g(v1)∑
j∈S′ g(vj)
≤ max
(
0, 1− (|S′| − 1) g(v
′
1)∑
j∈S′ g(v
′
j)
)
+ f`(λ) = a
′
1 + f`(λ),
so a1 − a′1 ≤ f`(λ) as desired.
Case 3: 1 ∈ S and 1 6∈ S′. In this case we cannot directly apply Lemma 4.2 to S′. Instead, let
R = {i | v′i ≥ v′1} =
{
i | vi ≥ v1/λ2
}
. We claim that S ⊆ R. This is because 1 6∈ S′, and therefore
all i ∈ S′ have v′i ≥ v′1, and therefore S ⊆ S′ ∪ {1} ⊆ R.
Thus, we can apply Lemma 4.1 to obtain:
a1 = 1− (|S| − 1) g(v1)∑
j∈S g(vj)
≤ 1− (|R| − 1) g(v1)∑
j∈R g(vj)
.
FAIRNESS IN AD AUCTIONS THROUGH INVERSE PROPORTIONALITY 13
Next, we can apply Lemma 4.2 to R to see that
1− (|R| − 1) g(v1)∑
j∈R g(vj)
≤ max
(
0, 1− (|R| − 1) g(v
′
1)∑
j∈R g(v
′
j)
)
+ f`(λ).
Finally, since advertiser 1 receives a zero allocation on value vector v′ and since v′1 = min ({v′i | i ∈ R}),
we know by Step 6 of Algorithm 1 that (|R|−1)g(v′1) ≥
∑
j∈R g(v
′
j). Thus, 1−(|R|−1) g(v
′
1)∑
j∈R g(v
′
j)
≤ 0.
This shows that a1 ≤ f`(λ) = a′1 + f`(λ) as desired. 
It remains to prove the lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. For i ∈ [m], let ai = 1− (m−1) (1/vi)∑
j∈[m](1/vj)
and a′i = 1− (m′−1) (1/vi)∑
j∈[m′](1/vj)
.
We wish to prove that for i ∈ [m], it holds that ai ≤ a′i. In order to compare these values, we
consider the following expressions for ai and a
′
i using Formulation 1 of IPA in Section 3. First, we
see that aj = max(0, 1−t ·(1/vj)), where t is the unique value such that
∑k
j=1 aj = 1. Equivalently,
since [m′] contains the set of advertisers that receive nonzero allocations, t is also the unique value
such that
∑
j∈[m′] aj = 1. Similarly, we see that a
′
j = 1− t′ ·(1/vj), where t′ is the unique value such
that
∑
j∈[m′] aj = 1. In other words, the only difference between t and t
′ is that the allocations are
not constrained to be nonnegative for t′. This implies that t′ ≤ t, and so for i ∈ [m]:
ai = max(0, 1− t · (1/vi)) = 1− t · (1/vi) ≤ 1− t′ · (1/vi) = a′i
as desired. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let us consider the expression we need to bound:
d := max
(
0, 1− (|S| − 1) g(vi)∑
j∈S g(vj)
)
−max
(
0, 1− (|S| − 1) g(v
′
i)∑
j∈S g(v
′
j)
)
= max
(
0, 1− (|S| − 1) g(vi)
g(vi) +
∑
j∈S;j 6=i g(vj)
)
−max
(
0, 1− (|S| − 1) g(vi/λ
2)
g(vi/λ2) +
∑
j∈S;j 6=i g(vj)
)
We want to show that d ≤ f`(λ). We first observe that the statement is vacuously true when
the maximum in the first term of d is equal to 0 as well as when |S| = 1. So henceforth we assume
that |S| ≥ 2 and 1− (|S| − 1) g(vi)g(vi)+∑j∈S;j 6=i g(vj) > 0.
Let b denote the ratio (
∑
j∈S,j 6=i g(vj))/g(vi). Recalling that g(vi/λ
2) = λ2`g(vi), we get,
d(b) = 1− |S| − 1
1 + b
−max
(
0, 1− |S| − 1
1 + λ−2`b
)
=
|S| − 1
max(|S| − 1, 1 + λ−2`b) −
|S| − 1
1 + b
Now we will consider three cases. First, if |S| = 2, the expression becomes
d(b) =
1
1 + λ−2`b
− 1
1 + b
This is identical to the expression we analysed for the 2 advertisers setting at the beginning of this
section. The expression maximized at b = λ`, and we obtain
d(b) ≤ λ
` − 1
λ` + 1
≤ 1− λ−`.
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Second, suppose that |S| > 2 and max(|S|−1, 1+λ−2`b) = |S|−1. This means that b ≤ λ2`(|S|−2).
Then we have, d(b) = 1 − (|S| − 1)/(1 + b). Note that d(b) is increasing as a function of b. So in
this case it is maximized at b = λ2`(|S| − 2). We get
max
b≤λ2`(|S|−2)
d(b) ≤ 1− |S| − 1
1 + λ2`(|S| − 2) ≤ 1− λ
−2` = f`(λ)
Finally, suppose that |S| > 2 and max(|S| − 1, 1 + λ−2`b) = 1 + λ−2`b. This means that b ≥
λ2`(|S| − 2). Then we have
d(b) = (|S| − 1)
(
1
1 + λ−2`b
− 1
1 + b
)
In this case, the function d(b) is non-increasing on b ∈ [λ2`(|S| − 2),∞) (see Proposition C.1).
Therefore, once again we have,
max
b≥λ2`(|S|−2)
d(b) ≤ 1− |S| − 1
1 + λ2`(|S| − 2) ≤ 1− λ
−2` = f`(λ)
This completes the proof. 
We now prove Theorem 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Let x be any value in [1,∞]. We consider the value vectors v = [x, . . . , x]
and v′ = [x2, 1, . . . , 1]. Notice that maxi∈[k]
(
max
(
vi
v′i
,
v′i
vi
))
= x. Observe that the allocation a′1 is
1− k−1
1−(k−1)g(1)/g(x2) . As k →∞, this becomes 1− g(x
2)
g(1) → 1− x−2`. In comparison, the allocation
a′1 → 0. Thus, we must have that f(x) ≥ 1− x−2`. 
5. Near-optimality of Inverse Proportional Allocation
In this section, we prove that inverse proportional allocation is near-optimal in comparison to
any prior-free allocation algorithm. First, we show in Section 5.1 that IPA is optimal for the family
of value-stability constraints f`: that is, no prior-free allocation algorithm can beat the performance
of IPA within this family of value-stability constraints. Then, we consider the performance of IPA
for value-stability constraints f that are not of the form f`. We construct an extension of IPA
called capped IPA that performs near-optimally for any “reasonable” function f satisfying a mild
constraint. In Section 5.2, we discuss this extension of IPA, and in Section 5.3, we prove our near-
optimality result: for any function f satisfying the constraint that admits a prior-free value-stable
allocation algorithm with approximation ratio α, there exists a capped IPA algorithm that achieves
an approximation ratio of Ω( αln(1/α)+1).
5.1. Optimality of IPA. Recall that Theorems 3.4 and 3.6 together imply that for any ` > 0,
it is possible to achieve value stability with respect to the function f` while obtaining an α` =
1 − ``/(` + 1)`+1 approximation to social welfare. We will now show that no prior-free allocation
algorithm that is value stable with respect to f` can obtain a better approximation as the number
of advertisers k tends to infinity.
Theorem 5.1. For every ` > 0, no prior-free allocation algorithm that is value stable with respect
to f` can obtain a worst case approximation ratio for social welfare over k advertisers that is better
than α` − 1/k.
Thus, within the family f`, the approximation ratio obtained by IPA is optimal within an addi-
tive factor of 1/k. In the limit as k → ∞, this theorem implies that IPA achieves the optimal
approximation ratio in comparison to any prior-free allocation algorithm that is value-stable for f`.
The proof of this theorem is based on the following lemma from [CIJ20] that we restate and
reprove for completeness.
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Lemma 5.2 ([CIJ20], rephrased). Let f : [1,∞] → [0, 1] be any weakly increasing function, and
λ > 1 be an arbitrary real number. Then, no prior free allocation algorithm over k advertisers
that is value-stable with respect to f can obtain an approximation to social welfare better than:(
1
k + f(λ) + λ
−2 (1− 1k − f(λ)).
Proof. Consider the value vectors v = [1, . . . , 1]. Since the total allocation is 1, there must exist
an advertiser i ∈ [k] such that ai ≤ 1/k. We define a value vector v′ that’s within a multiplicative
factor of λ on every coordinate and place a lower bound on its approximation ratio for social
welfare. More specifically, we consider v′ so v′i = λ and v
′
j = λ
−1 for j 6= i. Since the allocation is
value-stable, it must satisfy a′i ≤ f(λ) + ai ≤ 1k + f(λ). Thus, the approximation ratio for social
welfare is a′i + λ
−2(1− a′i). Using the above bound on a′i, we see that the approximation ratio is at
most 1k + f(λ) + λ
−2 (1− 1k − f(λ)) as desired. 
The proof of Theorem 5.1 now follows directly.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. The theorem follows from Lemma 5.2 by substituting f(λ) = 1 − λ−2`;
minimizing the expression over λ; and recalling that α` = minx∈(0,1)(1− x` + x`+1), which can be
written as minλ>1
(
1− λ−2` + λ−2(`+1)) = minλ>1 (f(λ) + λ−2(1− f(λ)). 
5.2. A simple extension of IPA. We now consider general value-stability constraints f , and
consider the design of algorithms that are value-stable for general f . As mentioned earlier, for every
function f with limx→∞ f(x) = 1, there exists a parameter ` > 0 such that f(x) ≤ f`(x) for all x ∈
[1,∞), and so value stability for such functions can be achieved with an IPA algorithm. However,
this family excludes stability constraints f with limx→∞ f(x) = c < 1. With this shortcoming
in mind, we propose an extension of IPA that we call capped IPA. The idea is to run IPA with
probability c, so that the maximum difference between any two advertiser’s allocations is always
capped by c.
Algorithm 5.3. The Capped Inverse Proportional Allocation algorithm with parameters
` and c applies the Inverse Proportional Algorithm with parameter ` with probability c and uniformly
assigns allocation across all advertisers with probability 1− c.
The value stability and social welfare properties of capped inverse proportional allocation follow
immediately from our analysis of IPA in the previous sections.
Corollary 5.4. Let ` > 0 and c ∈ [0, 1] be parameters, and let k > 0 be any number advertisers.
The capped inverse proportional allocation algorithm with parameters ` and c is value stable with
respect to any function f that satisfies f(λ) ≥ cf`(λ) = c(1 − λ−2`) for all λ ∈ [1,∞). Moreover,
this algorithm obtains a worst case approximation ratio for social welfare of at least
c · α` = c
(
1− 1
`+ 1
(
`
`+ 1
)`)
.
Proof. For any value vector v, we compare the allocation a of this capped IPA algorithm to the
allocation a′ of IPA with parameter `. For any i ∈ [k], it holds that ai = ca′i + (1 − c)/k. The
value-stability and social welfare properties then follow from Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.6. 
5.3. Near-optimality with respect to general value-stability functions. We now show that
capped inverse proportional allocation can perform near-optimally for any “reasonable” value sta-
bility constraint f : [1,∞]→ [0, 1]. First, we argue that any “reasonable” value-stability constraint
f should at minimum satisfy the following conditions: (a) f is weakly increasing, and (b) f(x)/ ln(x)
is weakly decreasing.
For constraint (a), observe that if a prior-free allocation algorithm is value-stable with respect
to f , then it is also value-stable with respect to g(x) = miny≥x g(y) which is weakly increasing.
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For constraint (b), observe that if a prior-free allocation algorithm is value-stable with respect
to f , then it is also value-stable with respect to g(x) = infn∈N nf(x1/n) (see Footnote 6). Then for
any x ∈ [1,∞] and n ∈ N, it holds that g(x) · n = n · infm∈Nmf(x1/m) ≥ infm′∈Nm′f(xn/m′) =
g(xn). This implies that g(x)ln(x) ≥ g(x
n)
ln(xn) . After some “smoothing”, this essentially guarantees that
g(x)/ ln(x) is weakly decreasing.
With these conditions in place, we consider value-stability constraints f where f is weakly
increasing and f(x)/ ln(x) is weakly decreasing. We now show that for any f of this form, the
family of capped inverse proportional allocation algorithms achieves value-stability while obtaining
an approximation ratio that is only logarithmically worse than optimal.
Theorem 5.5. Let f : [1,∞]→ [0, 1] be any function where f(x)/ ln(x) is weakly decreasing and f
is weakly increasing. Suppose that there exists a prior-free allocation algorithm that is value-stable
for f that achieves a worst-case approximation ratio of α. Then, there exist parameters ` ∈ (0,∞)
and c ∈ [0, 1] such that the capped IPA algorithm with parameters ` and c is value-stable for f and
achieves a worst-case approximation ratio of at least:
(
α/2
2 ln(1/α)+1
)
.
The proof of Theorem 5.5 leverages Lemma 5.2 to lower bound f(x) as a function of the approx-
imation ratio. This bound is applied to a carefully chosen point, and the basic properties of f can
be used to extend this to a pointwise lower bound by a “well-behaved” function F . This function F
can be approximated from below by a function of the form c · f2`. We then show that capped IPA
with parameters ` and c achieves a significant fraction of the approximation ratio of the optimal
approximation ratio for the value-stability constaint f .
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Let c = α−α
2
1−α2 =
α
1+α , and let F (x) = min(c, ln(x) · c/ ln(1/α)). We begin by
showing that f(x) ≥ F (x) for all x ∈ [1,∞]. By Lemma 5.2, we know that f(x) ≥ (α− x−2)/(1−
x−2) for every x ∈ [1,∞). Now, we apply this fact at x = 1/α to conclude that f(1/α) ≥ α−α2
1−α2 = c.
Using the basic properties of f , we can extend this to obtain a pointwise lower bound by F . Since
f(x)
ln(x) is decreasing, this means that for x ≤ 1/α, we have that f(x) ≥ ln(x) · c/ ln(1/α) = F (x).
Moreover, since f is weakly increasing, we know that for x ≥ 1/α, we have that f(x) ≥ c = F (x).
Putting these two conditions together, we have that f(x) ≥ min(c, ln(x) · c/ ln(1/α)) = F (x).
Now, we relate F (x) to the value-stability condition for an capped IPA algorithm. By Proposition
C.2, we know that min(c, ln(x) · c/ ln(1/α)) ≥ c(1 − x−1/ ln(1/α)). This implies that f(x) ≥ c(1 −
x−1/ ln(1/α)) as desired. Let ` = 1/(2 ln(1/α)). We claim that the capped IPA with parameters ` and
c is value-stable for f . By Corollary 5.4, we know that this capped IPA algorithm is value-stable
for f(x) ≥ c(1− x−2`) = α−α2
1−α2 (1− x−1/ ln(1/α)), as desired.
Now, we show that this capped IPA algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of at least(
α/2
2 ln(1/α)+1
)
. By Corollary 5.4, we know that the algorithm achieves social welfare of at least
c
(
1− 1
`+ 1
(
`
`+ 1
)`)
≥ α− α
2
1− α2
(
1− 1
`+ 1
)
=
α
1 + α2
(
1
2 ln(1/α) + 1
)
.
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 5.5 shows that capped IPA achieves an approximation ratio of at least
(
α/2
2 ln(1/α)+1
)
,
where α is the best possible approximation ratio achieved by any prior-free allocation algorithm
that is value-stable for f . In fact, this result also shows that when α ≥ 0.5 (i.e. the best possible
approximation ratio achieves a 0.5 fraction of the social welfare), then capped IPA achieves a
approximation ratio of at least 0.2α. In other words, in this regime, capped IPA is able to achieve
a constant fraction of the optimal approximation ratio. When the approximation ratio is small, the
guarantees provided in Theorem 5.5 do degrade with ln(1/α). An interesting direction for future
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work would be to try to close this gap and maintain a constant fraction of the optimal social welfare
even when the approximation ratio is small.
6. Subset fairness
By satisfying value stability, the mechanisms that we design guarantee that if two users have
similar values from all advertisers, then the difference between the allocation that they receive from
any advertiser must be small. However, in [CIJ20], we observed that in some settings this notion
is too weak. To take an example, consider job ads, and suppose that two users Alice and Bob have
similar value vectors across job advertisers, but that all high paying job ads value Alice slightly
less than Bob. Then, a value-stable ad auction may show every high paying job ad with slightly
less probability to Alice than to Bob. However, considering the set of all high paying jobs together,
Alice may see a job in this set with far lower probability than Bob. The approach in [CIJ20] is to
impose value-stability with respect to arbitrary such groups of advertisers.9 This guarantees that
users are not discriminated against even when considering sets of related ads rather than just a
single ad.
Our family of IPA auctions does not always satisfy value-stability with respect to arbitrary such
groups of advertisers (as we discuss in Section 6.1). Indeed it appears to be challenging to satisfy
this stronger fairness property while also guaranteeing a constant factor approximation in social
welfare. In this work, we take a more nuanced approach and consider notions that interpolate
between value-stability on each advertiser and value-stability on all possible groups of advertisers.
Specifically, we require the algorithm to satisfy value-stability with respect to a restricted collection
of sets over advertisers.
Definition 6.1. Let C be a collection of subsets of [k]. An allocation is subset-value-stable with
respect to C and a function f : [1,∞]→ [0, 1] if the following condition is satisfied for every pair of
value vectors v and v′ and for every C ∈ C:∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈C
ai(v)−
∑
i∈C
ai(v
′)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ f(λ) for all i ∈ [k], where λ is defined as maxi∈[k]
(
max
{
vi
vi′
,
vi
′
vi
})
.
We envision that a trusted authority selects the collection C over which value-stability must
be guaranteed. This may include, for example, all job ads belonging to a particular category or
a particular compensation bracket, etc. When C contains all subsets of [k], then this definition
provides the guarantees proposed in [CIJ20]. When C only consists of subsets of size 1, then this
definition reduces to the usual definition of value-stability. For intermediate collections C, the
definition is stronger than the usual definition of value-stability but not as strong as the notion
proposed in [CIJ20]. For convenience, we often do not include singleton sets by default in C. Our
intention is for the algorithm to satisfy subset-value-stability in addition to value-stability.
In Section 6.1, we first argue that subset-value-stability comes at a cost: the inverse-proportional
allocation algorithm defined in Section 3 satisfies value-stability, but we show that it does not satisfy
subset-value-stability for C = 2[k]. In fact, there is a performance gap between algorithms that
satisfy subset-value-stability for C = 2[k] and those that only satisfy value-stability. In Section 6.2,
we develop auctions that guarantee subset-value-stability for any given collection C, while obtaining
approximation ratios that degrade with the complexity of C.
6.1. A gap between value-stability and subset-value-stability. We consider the strongest
version of subset-value-stability , where C = 2[k]. We first show that the class of inverse-proportional
9In [CIJ20], this notion is referred to as total-variation fairness. This corresponds to ensuring that the distributions
over ads assigned to similar users are not only close under `∞ distance, but also close under `1 or total variation
distance.
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allocation algorithms described in Section 3 does not satisfy subset-value-stability with respect to
C = 2[k].
Example 6.2. Let k be any even number and let λ > 1 be a parameter that we will specify later. Let
v and v′ be defined as follows: suppose that vj = 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k/2 and vj = λ for k/2+1 ≤ j ≤ k;
whereas v′j = λ for 1 ≤ j ≤ k/2 and v′j = 1 for k/2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
We now observe that for some (not too small) value of λ, the inverse-proportional allocation
algorithm with parameter ` will assign a′i = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k/2 and aj = 0 for all k/2 + 1 ≤
j ≤ k. As a result, it would hold that ∑k/2−1i=1 ai = 1 and ∑k/2−1i=1 a′i = 0. In fact it suffices to set
λ =
(
k/2−1
k/2
)1/`
so that f`(λ) = 1−
(
k/2−1
k/2
)2 ≈ 4/k.10
Example 6.2 shows that even for two value vectors that are very close to each other, there may
exist a subset of advertisers on which one value vector receives an allocation of 1 while the other
value vector receives an allocation of 0. Thus, the example violates subset-value-stability with
respect to C = 2[k] and f`. Is it possible to construct a different allocation algorithm that is subset-
value-stable for C but performs as well as inverse-proportional allocation on social welfare? We
show that this is not possible for small values of `: there is a gap between the competitive ratio
achievable by any total-variation fair algorithm and the competitive ratio of the inverse-proportional
algorithm.
Theorem 6.3. For any 0 < ` < ∞, let T (k, `) be the optimal competitive ratio achievable by
any prior-free, anonymous allocation algorithm that achieves subset-value-stability for C = 2[k]
and f`. Let L(`) denote the competitive ratio achieved by the inverse-proportional allocation algo-
rithm with parameter `. Then, it holds that lim supk→∞ T (k, `) ≤ 2`2`+1 and lim infk→∞ L(`)T (k,`) ≥
2`+1
`+1
(
1
2 +
1
2`
(
1− ``
(`+1)`
))
. In particular, lim inf`→0
(
lim infk→∞
L(`)
T (k,`)
)
=∞.
6.2. Subset-value-stability over restricted set collections. Given the gap in Theorem 6.3,
we ask whether good competitive ratios can be achieved if subset-value-stability is only required
over some restricted collection of sets of advertisers as opposed to arbitrary subsets of advertisers.
We show in the remainder of this section that such improved guarantees are indeed possible. In
this section, we describe and motivate three kinds of set collections that enable positive results.
As a warm-up, one might ask whether the challenge with ensuring subset-value-stability for
C = 2[k] is that there are exponentially many fairness constraints to satisfy – one for each possible
subset of advertisers. This turns out to not be the case. Indeed, the proof of Theorem 6.3 relies on
requiring subset-value-stability with respect to a collection of only Θ(log k) subsets of advertisers.
Our first observation is that subset-value-stability over sets of small size can be achieved without
much loss in performance. To formalize this, we define the “bandwidth” of a collection of sets—the
size of the largest set in the collection—as a measure of complexity of the set system:
Definition 6.4. The width of a collection C ⊂ 2[k] of subsets of advertisers, denoted ω, is defined
as maxC∈C |C|.
While collections of small sets may not be very interesting in themselves, this definition leads
us to a more nuanced notion of complexity of set systems. Given a set system C ⊂ 2[k], we will
say that two advertisers i and j are equivalent if they belong to exactly the same sets in C: for all
C ∈ C, i ∈ C ⇐⇒ j ∈ C. This partitions advertisers into equivalence classes or clusters. Let
L1, L2, · · · denote these clusters. Every set C ∈ C is then the union of some subset of the clusters.
We will define the “cluster bandwidth” of a collection of sets, denoted ωcluster, as the maximum
over all sets C ∈ C of the number of clusters contained in C.
10With these values, we have (k − 1) (k/2)/(k/2−1)
k/2+(k/2)((k/2)/(k/2−1)) = 1, and so the advertisers with values λ will get
dropped.
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Definition 6.5. Given the partition {L1, L2, · · · } of advertisers into clusters, as described above,
the cluster bandwidth of a collection C ⊂ 2[k] of subsets of advertisers, denoted ωcluster(C), is defined
as maxC∈C |{i : Li ⊂ C}|.
Many interesting set collections can have low cluster bandwidth. For example, when the sets
C ∈ C are disjoint, the cluster bandwidth of the collection is simply 1. Likewise, when advertisers
have few relevant attributes, the cluster bandwidth is no larger than the number of different values
the attributes can take. For example, suppose that we classify job ads according to whether they
are high pay, medium pay, or low pay jobs, and whether they are tech sector, or finance, or academic
jobs. Then there are nine possible kinds of ads and the sets in our collection may correspond to
some subset of these nine types. Then, the cluster bandwidth of this set collection is no more than
nine.
Finally, we consider settings where the subset-value-stability constraints apply only over small
sub-categories of advertisers. For example, we may be interested in providing fairness guarantees
across arbitrary sets of job ads relevant to a single geographical area. In this case, we would
partition the set of all advertisers according to geographic location, and then enforce subset-value-
stability over arbitrary subsets that lie entirely within a single component of the partition. The
performance of our allocation algorithm will then depend on the sizes of the components of the
partition.
Definition 6.6. Let {L1, L2, · · · } be a partition of advertisers into clusters. Let C ⊂ 2[k] be a set
collection where for each set C ∈ C, there exists an index i with C ⊂ Li. We define the partitioned
width of C, denoted ωpart(C), as maxi |Li|.
6.2.1. Algorithms achieving subset-value-stability. We now construct variants of inverse-proportional
allocation that are competitive for social welfare while satisfying subset-value-stability over small-
width set collections as defined in the previous subsection. We use three building blocks for our
constructions, put together in novel ways: the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm, the capped
inverse-proportional allocation algorithm (Algorithm 5.3) with different settings of c < 1, and the
proportional allocation algorithm of [CIJ20]. As described previously, inverse-proportional alloca-
tion aggressively favors high values but hurts advertisers with low values when these are numerous.
Capped inverse-proportional allocation places an upper bound on the maximum allocation received
by any advertiser and thus turns out to provide stronger subset-value-stability guarantees while
maintaining a good competitive ratio. At the other extreme, proportional allocation provides very
strong subset-value-stability guarantees, but the competitive ratio suffers. Thus, the three types of
allocation rules address different aspects of subset-value-stable allocation. However, putting them
requires care so as to not magnify differences in allocation across different users.
We first describe how capped inverse-proportional allocation (Algorithm 5.3) achieves subset-
value-stability across small sets while maintaining a good competitive ratio. We already showed in
Corollary 5.4 that capped inverse-proportional allocation with parameters ` and 1/n achieves at
least a α`/n competitive ratio; now, we show that this algorithm satisfies subset-value-stability on
all subsets of size n.
Theorem 6.7. Let C be a collection such that ω(C) ≤ n. For any 0 < ` <∞, the capped inverse-
proportional allocation algorithm with parameters g(x) = x−` and 1/n achieves subset-value-stability
with respect to C and f`(λ) = 1− λ−2`.
Proof. Consider two value vectors v and v′ such that maxi∈[k]
(
max
{
vi
vi′ ,
vi
′
vi
})
= λ. For value-
stability, by Theorem 3.4, we know that the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with pa-
rameter g(x) = x−` assigns allocations ai and a′i that satisfy |ai − a′i| ≤ f(λ). Now, notice that
the capped inverse-proportional allocation algorithm assigns allocations Bi =
ai
n +
1
k
(
1− 1n
)
and
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B′i =
a′i
n +
1
k
(
1− 1n
)
. We see that |Bi −B′i| = 1n |ai − a′i| ≤ 1nf(λ). Now, let C be a subset in C. We
know that |C| ≤ n, so ∣∣∑i∈C Bi −∑i∈C B′i∣∣ ≤∑i∈C |Bi −B′i| ≤ |C|f(λ)/n ≤ f(λ). 
Next we combine capped inverse proportional allocation with inverse proportional allocation
to handle set collections with small cluster width. At a high level, we use the capped inverse-
proportional allocation algorithm to first allocate probabilities to each cluster of advertisers as
defined in Definition 6.5, and then use the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm to further
subdivide the allocation to advertisers within each cluster. More formally:
Algorithm 6.8. The algorithm with parameters ` and n operates as follows:
(1) Partition advertisers into clusters L = {L1, L2, · · · }, as defined in Definition 6.5.
(2) Use the capped inverse-proportional allocation algorithm (Algorithm 5.3) with parameters
g(x) = x−` and 1/n on {L1, L2, · · · }, treating each set Li as an advertiser with value
maxj∈Li vj. Obtain an allocation {ALi}Li∈L.
(3) For each Li ∈ L, run the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter g(x) =
x−` to obtain an allocation {Bj}j∈Li. Now, set aj = Bj ·ALi.
This algorithm satisfies nice properties in terms of value-stability and competitive ratio:
Theorem 6.9. Consider collection of subsets C such that ωcluster(C) ≤ n. Then, Algorithm 6.8
with parameters ` and n satisfies subset-value-stability with respect to C and f`(λ) = 1 − λ−2` as
well as value-stability for f(λ) = 2 · f`(λ) = 2(1 − λ−2`). Furthermore, the algorithm achieves a
competitive ratio of at least 1nα
2
` .
Proof. Consider two value vectors v and v′ such that maxi∈[k]
(
max
{
vi
vi′ ,
vi
′
vi
})
= λ. To show
subset-value-stability we use that every set in C is a union of at most n sets in L. Suppose that
C = Li1 ∪ Li2 . . . ∪ Lim where m ≤ n. Using Theorem 6.7, we know that:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈C
aj −
∑
j∈C
a′j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
l=1
ALil −
m∑
l=1
A′Lil
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1− λ−2`.
To show value-stability, we use the fact that for any Li ∈ L, we know |ALi − A′Li | ≤ 1 − λ−2` by
Theorem 6.7, and for any j ∈ Li, we know |Bj − B′j | ≤ 1 − λ−2` by Theorem 3.4. Thus, we know
that |aj−a′j | = |Bj ·ALi−B′jALi | ≤ |Bj−B′j |ALi + |ALi−A′Li |B′j ≤ 2(1−λ−2`). The approximation
ratio follows from Corollary 5.4 (on the first-level allocation) and Theorem 3.6 (on the second-level
allocation). 
Finally, we show that a similar two-step composition provides fairness for set collections with
small partitioned width. For this setting, we compose the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm
with the proportional allocation algorithm in [CIJ20]. In particular, denoting the partition over
advertisers as L1, L2, · · · , we use Algorithm 5.3 to perform the allocation across different Lis,
and then use the proportional allocation algorithm to divide the allocation within each Li. More
formally:
Algorithm 6.10. The algorithm with parameters ` and L = (L1, L2 . . .) operates as follows:
(1) Use the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter g(x) = x−` on (L1, L2 . . .),
treating each set Li as an advertiser with bid maxj∈Li vj. Obtain an allocation {ALi}Li∈L.
(2) For each Li ∈ L, run the proportional allocation algorithm with parameter g(x) = x2` to
obtain an allocation {Bj}j∈Li. Now, set aj = Bj ·ALi.
This algorithm achieves subset-value-stability over the collection C = ∪i2Li and competitive ratio
guarantees that degrade with ωpart(C).
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Theorem 6.11. Let L = (L1, L2, . . .) be a partition of [k]. Consider a collection C = ∪i2Li such
that ωpart(C) = n. Algorithm 6.10 with parameters ` and L satisfies subset-value-stability with
respect to C and f(λ) = 2 · f`(λ) = 2(1 − λ−2`) as well as value-stability with respect to C and
f(λ) = 2 · f` = 2(1−λ−2`). Moreover, the algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of at least n− 2`α`.
Proof. Consider two value vector v and v′ such that maxi∈[k]
(
max
{
vi
vi′ ,
vi
′
vi
})
= λ. We first
show subset-value-stability and value-stability. We use the fact that for any Li ∈ L, we know∣∣ALi −A′Li∣∣ ≤ f`(λ) by Theorem 3.4. Moreover, for any Li ∈ L and for any S ⊆ Li, we know∣∣∣Bj −B′j∣∣∣ ≤ f`(λ) by the properties of the proportional allocation algorithm shown in [CIJ20].
Thus, for every S ⊆ Li, we know that
∣∣∣∑j∈S aj −∑j∈S a′j∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣(∑j∈S Bj) ·Aj − (∑j∈S B′j)A′Li∣∣∣ ≤∣∣∣∑j∈S Bj −∑j∈S B′j∣∣∣ALi + |ALi − A′Li |(∑j∈S B′j) ≤ 2f`(λ). The competitive ratio follows from
Theorem 3.6 (on the first-level allocation) and the competitive ratio bound in [CIJ20] (on the
second-level allocation). 
7. Future work
In this work we address the tradeoffs between fairness and social welfare through a simplistic
model that assumes that advertisers bid to maximize their utility in every auction. In reality,
advertisers have budgets and optimize for their long term returns. Incorporating fairness constraints
into these more general models of ad auctions is an interesting avenue for future work. For the model
we study, our work presents an alternative to the proportional allocation mechanism of [CIJ20]. The
two classes of allocation algorithms perform well under different contexts, and it would be interesting
to understand whether one can interpolate between the two to obtain fairness guarantees as strong
as those of proportional allocation while at the same time achieving performance commensurate
with that of inverse proportional allocation. Finally, a very interesting open direction is to examine
ad auction design under a group fairness constraint.
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Appendix A. Multi-Category Setting
Platforms often service advertisers from many different categories (e.g. jobs advertisers, credit
advertisers, housing advertisers, etc.) that compete against each other for the same users. The
challenge is that for different categories, what constitutes similarity between users might be very
different. For example, two users who are considered similar in the context of credit ads might
be considered very different in the context of job ads. We showed in [CIJ20] that in this setting,
because of differing amounts of competition for different users, no mechanism can simultaneously
achieve multiple-task fairness as well as good social welfare. In fact, we construct examples where
multiple-task fairness results in allocations that are worse for all users than certain allocations that
do not satisfy multiple-task fairness. In this context, we advocated for instead requiring envy-
freeness across categories. In [CIJ20], we proposed a new notion of compositional fairness where
every user is allowed to select a few categories of their choice with the dual guarantee that:
(1) The user’s total allocation of ads within their favored categories is as large as that of any
other user (envy-freeness).
(2) The mix of ads that the users receive within any category is fair according to the single-
category fairness definition discussed previously (value-stability).
The allocation algorithms we develop in this work for a single category of ads combine in a straight-
forward fashion with [CIJ20]’s envy-free algorithms for across-category fairness to produce alloca-
tions that satisfy compositional fairness. In doing so, we significantly improve upon the approx-
imation ratios in the previous work, since our guarantees from within-category allocations carry
over to the compositional setting.
Appendix B. Payment Rule
For the case of two advertisers, k = 2, supporting payments for the IPA can be calculated easily.
Here is an explicit formula for the payment of advertiser 1 when the algorithm is parameterized by
the function g(x) = 1/x.
p1 = v2 ln
(
1 +
v1
v2
)
− v1v2
v1 + v2
.
Now, we consider k > 2. Here is a formula for the payment of advertiser 1 when the algorithm is
parameterized by the function g(x) = 1/x. If a1 = 0, then p1 = 0. Otherwise, p1 has the following
form. WLOG, suppose that v2 ≤ . . . ≤ vk. We know that the set of advertisers who receive nonzero
allocation can be expressed as {1} ∪ [m, k] for some 2 ≤ m ≤ k. Furthermore, let [m′, k] be the set
of advertisers who receive nonzero allocation on [0, v2, . . . , vk]. Let cm′−1 = (
∑k
j=m′ vj
−1)/(k−m′),
let ci = (k − i)vi−1 −
∑k
j=i+1 v
−1
j for m
′ ≤ i ≤ m − 1, and let cm = 1/v1. Then the payment is
equal to:
p1 =
k −m′∑k
j=m′ vj
−1 −
k −m+ 1
v1−1 +
∑k
j=m vj
−1 +
m∑
i=m′
(
k − i+ 1∑k
j=i vj
−1 log
(
1 + (1/ci)
∑k
j=i vj
−1
1 + (1/ci−1)
∑k
j=i vj
−1
))
.
Appendix C. Auxiliary Propositions and Proofs
We prove an auxiliary proposition used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Proposition C.1. Let c < 1 be a constant. Consider the function h(x) = 11+xc − 11+x on x ≥ 0.
Thus function is increasing when x ≤ 1√
c
and decreasing when x ≥ 1√
c
. Thus, the maximum is
attained when x = 1√
c
. (When c = 1, h(x) is always 0.)
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Proof. The derivative with respect to x is − c
(1+xc)2
+ 1
(1+x)2
. The function is weakly decreasing if
and only if c
(1+xc)2
≥ 1
(1+x)2
. This is equivalent to c + 2xc + x2c ≥ 1 + x2c2 + 2xc. Rearranging
yields c− 1 ≥ x2c(c− 1). Since c < 1, this is equivalently 1− c ≤ x2c(1− c), which is equivalently
x ≥ 1√
c
. 
We prove an auxiliary proposition used in the proof of Theorem 5.5.
Proposition C.2. Let 0 < c < 1 and r > 0 be parameters. For any x ∈ [1,∞), it holds that:
min(c, ln(x) · rc) ≥ c(1− x−r).
Proof. We see that c(1 − x−r) ≤ c trivially. Thus, it suffices to show that c(1 − x−r) ≤ ln(x) · rc.
Rearranging, this condition can be written as 1− x−r ≤ ln(xr), which can be written as x−r − 1 ≥
ln(x−r). Now, the inequality follows from the fact that ln(1 + y) ≤ y. 
We now prove Theorem 6.3. In the proof of Theorem 6.3, we use the following construction of
value vectors.
Example C.3. Let 0 < γ < 1, 0 < ` <∞, and n ∈ N be parameters. We construct an instance of
k = 2n advertisers and n+1 value vectors as follows. All of the value vectors will be permutations of
the same multi-set of values, but the ordering across advertisers will differ. We define the multi-set
of values V as follows: V will have 1 copy of 1, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, V will have 2i−1 copies of γi.
We now design a sequence of n+ 1 value vectors v(0), v(1), v(2), . . ., v(n). The value vector v(0)
will organize the values in V so that v
(0)
1 ≥ v(0)2 ≥ . . . ≥ v(0)k . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the value vector v(i)
will organize the values so that v
(i)
j = v
(0)
j for 2
i + 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and v(i)j = v(0)2i+1−j for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2i
(i.e. the first 2i−1 values are flipped with the next set of 2i−1 values, and everything else stays the
same.)
Proof of Theorem 6.3. To compute an upper bound on T (k, `), we use the construction in Example
C.3. The fact that the algorithm is prior-free and anonymous requires that the allocation assigned
to each of these value vectors is always the same up to the appropriate permutation. For each
0 ≤ i ≤ n, suppose that the algorithm places a total allocation of ai on the 2i copies of γi. We
know that the approximation ratio is thus
∑n
i=0(ai · γi).
Now, we require subset-value-stability on the collection of sets Si :=
{
1, . . . , 2i−1
}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Notice that this collection only has Θ(n) = Θ(log k) sets. In particular, we enforce the constraint
for Si on value vectors v
(0) and v(i). For v(0) there is a total allocation of a0 + . . .+ ai−1 on Si; for
v(i) there is a total allocation of ai on Si. This means that:
a0 + . . .+ ai−1 − ai ≤ f(γ−i).
The other constraint is that a0 + . . .+ an ≤ 1 since the total allocation cannot exceed 1. It is easy
to see that the social welfare is thus maximized when all of the inequalities are tight. This means
that a0 =
1
2n +
∑n
i=1
f(γ−i)
2i
and for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, aj = 12n−j+1 +
(∑n
i=j+1
f(γ−i)
2i−j+1
)
− f(γ−j)2 . Observe
that this allocation is always nonnegative (and thus valid) because f is an increasing function.
This means that:
T (k, `) ≤
(
1
2n
+
n∑
i=1
f(γ−i)
2i
)
+
n∑
K=1
γK
(
1
2n−K+1
+
(
n∑
i=K+1
f(γ−i)
2i−K+1
)
− f(γ
−K)
2
)
.
REFERENCES 25
Now, let’s consider the subset-value-stability constraint with f` for some parameter 0 < ` <∞.
Let’s use the fact that f(γ−K) = 1− γ2K`. Now, we can conclude that:
T (k, `) ≤
(
1−
n∑
i=1
γ2i·`
2i
)
+
n∑
k=1
γK
(
−
(
n∑
i=K+1
γ2i·`
2i−K+1
)
+
γ2K·`
2
)
≤
(
1−
n∑
i=1
γ2i·`
2i
)
+
1
2
(
n∑
K=1
γK(2`+1)
)
−
(
n∑
K=1
γK
(
n∑
i=K+1
γ2i·`
2i−K+1
))
.
The remainder of the analysis boils down to analyzing this expression. Let the RHS of this
expression be E(k, `, γ). We first compute E(γ, `) := limk→∞E(k, `, γ). Notice that taking a limit
as k →∞ is the same as taking a limit as n→∞. Let’s handle each term in the RHS separately.
(1) For the first term, the limit as n → ∞ of
(
1−∑ni=1 γ2i`2i ) is (1−∑∞i=1 γ2i`2i ) = 1 −(∑∞
i=0
γ2i`
2i
− 1
)
= 2− 1
1−γ2`/2 .
(2) For the second term, the limit as n → ∞ is 12
(∑n
K=1 γ
(2`+1)K
)
= γ
2`+1
2
(∑n−1
K=0 γ
(2`+1)K
)
.
Taking a limit as n→∞, we obtain γ2`+12 11−γ2`+1 .
(3) For the third term, 12
(∑n
K=1 γ
K · 2K
(∑n
i=K+1
γ2i·`
2i
))
= 12
(∑n
K=1 γ
K · 2K γ2`(K+1)
2K+1
(∑n−K−1
i=0
γ2i·`
2i
))
.
We can write this as: 14γ
(∑n
K=1 γ
(K+1)(2`+1)
(∑n−K−1
i=0
γ2i·`
2i
))
. Now, we can write this as:
1
4γ
(
n∑
K=1
γ(K+1)(2`+1)
(
1− γ(n−K)l/2n−K
1− γ2`/2
))
.
We can write this as:
1
4γ
[(
n∑
K=1
γ(K+1)(2`+1)
(
1
1− γ2`/2
))
−
(
n∑
k=1
γ(K+1)(2`+1)
(
γ2`(n−K)/2n−K
1− γ2`/2
))]
.
(a) The first part is
(∑n
K=1 γ
(K+1)(2`+1)
(
1
1−γ2`/2
))
=
(
1
1−γ2`/2
)∑n
K=1 γ
(K+1)(2`+1) =(
γ2(2`+1)
1−γ2`/2
)∑n−1
K=0 γ
K(2`+1). Taking a limit as n→∞, we obtain
(
γ2(2`+1)
1−γ2`/2
)
1
1−γ2`+1 .
(b) For the second part:
1
1− γ2`/2
(
n∑
K=1
γK+1γ2(n+1)`/2n−K
)
=
2
1− γ2`/2
γ2γ2(n+1)`
2n
(
n∑
K=1
γK−12K−1
)
=
1
1− γ2`/2
γ2γ2(n+1)`
2n
1− γn2n
1− 2γ
=
γ2+2`
(1− γ2`/2)(1− 2γ)γ
2n`(1/2n − γn).
This goes to 0 as n→∞.
Thus, the third term overall becomes
(
γ4`+1
4(1−γ2`/2)
)
1
1−γ2`+1 .
Putting it all together, we obtain that for every γ < 1, it holds that:
E(`, γ) = lim
k→∞
E(`, k, γ) = 2− 1
1− γ2`/2 +
γ2`+1
2
1
1− γ2`+1 −
(
γ4`+1
4(1− γ2`/2)
)
1
1− γ2`+1 .
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Now, let E(`) := limγ→1E(`, γ). We claim that E(`) = 2`2`+1 . Notice that
E(`) = lim
γ→1
(
2− 1
1− γ2`/2 +
γ2`+1
2
1
1− γ2`+1 −
(
γ4`+1
4(1− γ2`/2)
)
1
1− γ2`+1
)
.
We claim that limγ→1
(
2− 1
1−γ2`/2 +
γ2`+1
2
1
1−γ`+1 −
(
γ4`+1
4(1−γ2`/2)
)
1
1−γ2`+1
)
= 2`2`+1 . We see that 2−
1
1−γ2`/2 → 0 as γ → 1. Thus, what remains is:
γ2`+1
(
2(1− γ2`/2)− γ2`)
4(1− γ2`+1)(1− γ2`/2) =
γ2`+1
(
2− 2γ2`)
4(1− γ2`+1)(1− γ2`/2) =
γ2`+1
2(1− γ2`/2)
1− γ2`
1− γ2`+1 .
We see that γ
2`+1
2(1−γ2`/2) → 1. Notice that 1−γ
2`
1−γ2`+1 → 2`2`+1 , as desired. Since T (k, `) ≤ E(`, k, γ)
for every γ and every k, this means that lim supk→∞ T (k, `) ≤ lim supk→∞E(`, k, γ) = E(`, γ) for
every γ < 1, and thus lim supk→∞ T (k, `) ≤ limγ→1E(`, γ) = E(`) = 2`2`+1 .
Now, we analyze L(`)T (k,`) in the limit as k →∞. Observe that L(`)T (k,`) ≥
1− 1
`+1(
`
`+1)
`
E(`,k,γ) . In particular,
we have that:
lim inf
k→∞
L(`)
T (k, `) ≥ lim infk→∞
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
E(`, k, γ)
=
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
lim sup k →∞E(`, k, γ) =
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
limk→∞E(`, k, γ)
=
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
E(`, γ)
.
Since this holds for every γ > 1, we know that:
lim inf
k→∞
L(`)
T (k, `) ≥ lim supγ→1
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
E(`, γ)
=
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
lim infγ→1E(`, γ)
=
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
limγ→1E(`, γ)
=
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
E(`)
=
1− 1`+1
(
`
`+1
)`
2`
2`+1
=
2`+ 1
`+ 1
`+ 1−
(
`
`+1
)`
2`
=
2`+ 1
`+ 1
1
2
+
1−
(
`
`+1
)`
2`

=
2`+ 1
`+ 1
(
1
2
+
1
2`
(
1− `
`
(`+ 1)`
))
.
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This can be lower bounded by: 12`
(
1− ``
(`+1)`
)
. Now, let’s a limit as `→ 0 to obtain:
lim inf
`→0
(
lim inf
k→∞
L(`)
T (k, `)
)
≥ lim inf
`→0
(
1
2`
(
1− `
`
(`+ 1)`
))
=∞.

